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Competing Land Rights, Legal Redress,
and Political Settlement in Cyprus
Laura Matsont
Introduction
"Today, the keys do not need us anymore. They will stay as a
memento to remind us that we once had a house in the village
which became a ruin. ... In the foundations they buried our
whole life, our culture, our history, spiritual treasures, dreams
and traditions."'
After many decades of conflict between Greek Cypriot and
Turkish Cypriot residents of Cyprus, the Turkish army invaded
the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) on July 20, 1974. This military
endeavor displaced approximately 200,000 Greek Cypriots and
65,000 Turkish Cypriots; the Greek Cypriots migrated to the
southern portion of the island, while the Turkish Cypriots sought
refuge in the Turkish-controlled North.' When the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) declared its autonomy in
1975,' the already inequitable distribution of land resources
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1. PETER Loizos, IRON IN THE SOUL: DISPLACEMENT, LIVELIHOOD AND HEALTH
IN CYPRUS 173 (2008) [hereinafter IRON] (quoting a letter written by displaced
Greek Cypriot Loizos Pipis to his father).
2. For a more comprehensive background of the history and conflict in Cyprus,
see CLEMENT DODD, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF THE CYPRUS CONFLICT 20-277
(2010).
3. INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CTR., PROTRACTED INTERNAL
DISPLACEMENT IN EUROPE: CURRENT TRENDS AND WAYS FORWARD 9 (2009)
[hereinafter PROTRACTED INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT]; see also Murat Metin Hakki,
Property Wars in Cyprus: The Turkish Position According to the International Law,
12 TURKISH STUD. 79, 80 (2011). Contemporary displacement figures are
inconsistent, reflecting different political perspectives on the issue of property-the
RoC claims that 200,500 people remain internally displaced in Cyprus; the Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus puts the figure at zero. Id.
4. Terminology surrounding the different governmental players in Cyprus is
used inconsistently in the literature. In this Note, I will refer to the separate
governments as the TRNC and RoC. References to "Cyprus" or "Cypriot" (without
any governmental, Greek or Turkish-specific modifiers) are meant to indicate the
island and the island's population as a whole. The TRNC is recognized only by
Turkey; the RoC and the international community do not view it as an independent
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shifted from possession by the majority Greek Cypriot population
to the minority Turkish Cypriots.' After the 1974 invasion,
Turkish Cypriots, who comprised less than one-fifth of the island's
population, had control over half of its natural resources in the
North.6 By September 1975, only about 130 Turkish Cypriots
remained in the South, and no more than 500 Greek Cypriots
currently reside in the North. Today, Cyprus represents the
longest-standing situation of internal displacement in Europe.
As in many circumstances of displacement, the personal,
cultural, and political significance of land in Cyprus cannot be
understated.9 The issue of contested land rights manifests in the
national and regional political spheres. It factors heavily into
settlement negotiations, as well as in the lives of those displaced,
and of those who exercise concurrent rights to or physically occupy
contested lands.'o Contestations over land in Cyprus have been a
factor in localized acts of aggression, and have inspired initiatives
of reconciliation among Greek and Turkish Cypriot civil society
groups and individuals."
nation. See Robert I. Rotberg, Timing Is Almost Everything: Obstructionist
Leadership, Cypriot Style, 28 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 199, 200 (2004); Hakki,
supra note 3, at 82.
5. Deniz Senol Sert, Cyprus: Peace, Return and Property, 23 J. REFUGEE STUD.
238, 244-45 (2010) (arguing that in 1972, about seventy percent of Cyprus's total
gross output originated from land adjacent to and occupied by the Turkish army in
1974, including fertile agricultural land and well-developed tourism and industrial
sectors).
6. Id. The country was divided by the U.N.-administered "Green Line" which
bisects the country and the capital city, Nicosia. Rotberg, supra note 4, at 202.
7. AYLA GOREL & KUDRET OZERSAY, THE POLITICS OF PROPERTY IN CYPRUS:
CONFLICTING APPEALS TO 'BIzONALITY' AND 'HUMAN RIGHTS' BY THE TWO CYPRIOT
COMMUNITIES 4 (2006) [hereinafter CONFLICTING APPEALS]; IRON, supra note 1, at
182 (explaining that a small number of Karpassi Greek Cypriots, known as
englovismeni, remained under Turkish occupation; they numbered no more than
500 in 2004).
8. Sert, supra note 5, at 239.
9. Kudret Ozersay & Ayla Giirel, Property and Human Rights in Cyprus: The
European Court of Human Rights as a Platform of Political Struggle, 44 MIDDLE
EASTERN STUD. 291, 291 (2008) [hereinafter Property and Human Rights]; see also
Roger Zetter, Reconceptualizing the Myth of Return: Continuity and Transition
Amongst the Greek-Cypriot Refugees of 1974, 12 J. REFUGEE STUD. 1, 7 (1999). In
analyzing refugee's responses,
[I]t became clear that the myth of return was contingent on the
'constructed notion' of home as physical territory, space and symbol ....
[T]here is an implicit assumption, in the concept of displacement and
return, that 'a natural identity exists between people and places . . .
bounded territories which demarcate their distinct cultures.'
Id. (citations omitted).
10. Property and Human Rights, supra note 9, at 291.
11. A. Marco Turk, Cyprus Reunification Is Long Overdue: The Time Is Right
for Track III Diplomacy as the Best Approach for a Successful Negotiation of This
200 [Vol. 31:199
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Though legal and policy-oriented measures have attempted to
provide redress for lost access to land and resources, communities
forced to migrate have felt the impacts of dispossession in many
ways. Directly following displacement, many families were in a
state of destitution, and were forced to move frequently between
overcrowded temporary housing situations." For the majority of
those displaced, their loss of home," livelihood," cultural
institutions," and community" was compounded by higher rates of
mental and physical illness, 7 and integration challenges."
Although Greek Cypriots have fared relatively well compared
to other European internally displaced people (IDPs)," many
displaced Greek Cypriots have resisted integration in the RoC.20 A
large percentage of Greek Cypriots report a strong desire to
return, and a significant number of them have pursued various
national and international means to reclaim access to their
abandoned properties in the North."
Ethnic Conflict, 28 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 205, 218-19 (2006) [hereinafter
Reunification].
12. Peter Loizos, Displacement Shock and Recovery in Cyprus, 33 FORCED
MIGRATION REV. 40, 40 (2009) [hereinafter Displacement Shock] (basing his
conclusions upon research with Greek Cypriot refugees who fled from the village of
Argaki, in what is now the TRNC).
13. Id. at 40-41 (detailing the various Emergency Plans that the Cyprus
government implemented in order to alleviate housing and unemployment concerns
among displaced populations).
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg &
Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 293-94 (7th Cir. 1990) (analyzing the theft
of Greek Orthodox cultural and religious artifacts from northern Cyprus after the
1974 Turkish invasion).
16. See Rebecca Brubaker, From Ethnic Insiders to Refugee Outsiders: A
Community Level Ethnography of Greek Cypriot Identity Formation and
Transference Since Displacement 21 (Refugee Stud. Ctr., Working Paper No. 59,
2010) (explaining how the displaced individuals she interviewed tried to build
group cohesion as their community was dispersed within Cyprus and throughout
the world).
17. Peter Loizos et al., Hearts, As Well As Minds: Wellbeing and Illness Among
Greek Cypriot Refugees, 20 J. REFUGEE STUD. 86, 93-97, 101-02 (2007) [hereinafter
Hearts] (reporting increased depressive illness and cardiovascular illness rates
among the displaced Greek Cypriot village than among the non-displaced Greek
Cypriot village).
18. See Zetter, supra note 9, at 3 ("Since 1974, the idea of returning has been a
dominant theme for all the Greek Cypriots, not just the displaced; for some
refugees, return remains a profound conviction.").
19. PROTRACTED INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT, supra note 3, at 12 ("IDPs in Cyprus
are the exception in the region in terms of housing, since they live in conditions
similar to their non-displaced neighbours thanks to government assistance, a stable
economy and their own initiative.").
20. See Brubaker, supra note 16, at 16-21.
21. See Sert, supra note 5, at 239, 246-49. For a discussion of the sentimental
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However, existing mechanisms to resolve land disputes
remain inadequate. Political negotiations are currently slow-
moving, and litigation as a primary source of redress has not been
satisfying, due in part to the challenge of responding to such a
wide breadth of disputed land claims on a case-by-case basis.22
The Immovable Property Commission, the only domestic
mechanism for submitting claims in the North, has announced
that it will close its doors in December 2013, leaving no local
remedy for those with outstanding grievances.2 3
Circumstances of widespread, conflict-based displacement are
certainly not unique to Cyprus, and present an ongoing challenge
for states and international bodies.24 Many states, including
Kosovo, Hungary, South Africa, and Australia, have established
remedies for grievances arising from widespread takings and
dispossession of land.25 The challenge for Cyprus, of course, is how
and psychological value of Cypriot land, see id. at 245; INT'L CRISIS GROUP,
CYPRUS: BRIDGING THE PROPERTY DIVIDE 16 (2010) [hereinafter BRIDGING THE
PROPERTY DIVIDE]; Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 513,
522 (1997) (adjudicating claims related to the loss of property due to the Cyprus
conflict through the European Court of Human Rights); Case C-420/07, Apostolides
v. Orams, 2009 E.C.R. 1-3571 12 (determining the enforceability of a judgment
concerning the purchase of land formerly owned by Greek Cypriots who were
displaced).
22. See A. Marco Turk, Rethinking the Cyprus Problem: Are Frame-Breaking
Changes Still Possible Through Application of Intractable Conflict Intervention
Approaches to This "Hurting Stalemate"?, 29 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 463,
488-93 (2007) [hereinafter Rethinking] (laying out the role of property in each
party's negotiating stance); Cypriot Leaders Discuss Property Issues in UN-
Sponsored Talks on Reunification, U.N. NEWS CENTER (Sept. 6, 2011),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=39466.
23. Press Release, Turkish Rep. of N. Cyprus, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pub.
Relations Dep't, Deadline for the Application of Greek Cypriots to Immovable
Property Commission Has Been Extended for Two Years (Oct. 27, 2011), available
at http://www.trncinfo.com/tanitma/en/index.asp?sayfa=haberdetay&newsid=1029
[hereinafter Press Release, Turkish Rep. of N. Cyprus]. The IPC had originally
announced that it would close on December 11, 2011, but later extended the
deadline by two years. Stefanos Evripidou, Two Months Left to Apply to IPC,
CYPRUS MAIL (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.cyprus-mail.com/cyprus/two-months-left-
apply-ipc/20111020.
24. PROTRACTED INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT, supra note 3, at 9 (noting that in
Europe alone, there are around 2.5 million IDPs).
25. The UN-led mission in Kosovo created a reparations program that provided
rights to restitution or compensation to any persons who were dispossessed of
property as a result of discrimination from 1989 to 1999. See U.N. Interim Admin.
Mission in Kos., On Residential Property Claims and the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence of the Housing and Property Directorate and the Housing and Property
Claims Commission, § 2.2, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/REG/2000/60 (Oct. 31, 2000).
Hungary enacted a series of compensation laws in the early 1990s designed to
provide compensation for property owners who were dispossessed as a result of
either Communist era expropriations or Holocaust era displacement. See, e.g.,
ISTVAN POGANY, RIGHTING WRONGS IN EASTERN EUROPE 155-65 (1997) (explaining
202
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to create a redress mechanism that takes into account the relief
already granted, and is an agreeable and enforceable method of
resolving competing claims to land in an unrecognized State.
This Note analyses the challenges of Cypriot land disputes,
particularly with regard to the rights that have already been
recognized and the remedies used to gain access to these rights,
and envisions a way forward. Part I of this Note will explore the
property grievance mechanisms that Cypriot claimants have
previously utilized. In particular, this section will assess the
rights, expectations, opportunities, and precedents created by
these mechanisms, and their impact on future land adjudication
implements. Part II will discuss the options available for Cypriots
once the Immovable Property Commission closes, and evaluate the
challenges of ongoing litigation, negotiated settlement, and
balancing the interests of local, national, and international actors
as they attempt to resolve displacement-oriented land claims going
forward. Part III envisions how to incorporate a locally legitimate
and equitable land solution that will fill the relief gap until a
broader settlement of the Cyprus situation is reached."
I. National and International Remedies
In 1989, a Greek Cypriot named Titina Loizidou filed the first
1974-oriented land dispossession case with the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR).27 Since that time, a variety of cases and
mechanisms have shaped the opportunities for redress. This Part
will discuss the remedies afforded by the ECtHR, the European
Court of Justice (ECJ), and local mechanisms, as well as the
potential for resolution of property concerns through political
the property restitution and compensation schemes instituted in post-Communist
Hungary in the late 1980s and early 1990s). In South Africa, the 1994 Restitution
of Land Rights Act established a system of restitution in the wake of Apartheid.
Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994 s. 2(1) (S. Mr.). The principle of restitution
or redress was later codified in the South African Constitutions. S. AFR. CONST.
(1996) § 25(7); Bernadette Atuahene, Things Fall Apart: The Illegitimacy of
Property Rights in the Context of Past Property Theft, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 833,
851, 860 (2009) [hereinafter Things Fall Apart]. Australia's system included a
twenty-year period in which Aboriginal people could make collective property
claims to land that was taken during conquest. Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1976
(NT) (Austl.).
26. This Note will focus on the mechanisms for resolving property disputes;
discussion of the appropriate distribution of property is beyond its scope. This Note
does not promote a pro-Greek Cypriot or pro-Turkish Cypriot perspective on the
conflict. However, due to the greater number of cases, and wider breadth of
literature reflecting on Greek Cypriot claims, there will be a disproportionate focus
on Greek Cypriot property claims in this Note. This focus is not intended to reflect
a political bias.




A. The European Court of Human Rights
The ECtHR has been the most widely-visited international
forum for adjudicating Cypriot land claims. 8 Yet, the ECtHR has
been a controversial venue for these claims for a number of
reasons. First, the ECtHR has generally declined to hear property
cases where the alleged violations occurred before the European
Convention on Human Rights fully entered into force in the
relevant state."9 This was not the case for Cyprus.30 Because
Turkey did not recognize the ECtHR's jurisdiction until January
1990, the court broke from its past practice and found that
dispossession since 1974 represented a "continuing violation" of
Greek Cypriot property rights to the present." By determining
that a "continuing violation" existed, the court justified its decision
to hear grievances filed after 1990.32
Second, Turkey has contended that it should not be held
responsible for violations in a region controlled by the autonomous
and democratic constitutional state of the TRNC." The ECtHR
has rejected these claims, holding Turkey liable for property-based
human rights violations, and compelling Turkey to pay substantial
damages.34 The ECtHR's focus on the RoC has given the
28. See, e.g, id.; Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 30
(2001); Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey, App. No. 46347/99, 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. 16 (2011);
Demades v. Turkey, App. No. 16219/90, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2 (2003); Alexandrou v.
Turkey, App. No. 16162/90, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2 (2009). The jurisdiction of the
ECtHR is rooted in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 32, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter
European Convention on Human Rights].
29. Rhodri C. Williams & Ayla GUrel, The European Court of Human Rights
and the Cyprus Property Issue: Charting a Way Forward 4 (Peace Research Inst.
Oslo, Working Paper No. 1/2011, 2011) ("[T]he Court has ruled that it has no
jurisdiction over claims arising from Cold War era property nationalizations,
regarding such nationalizations as 'instantaneous' acts that took place entirely
before the local entry into force of the Convention, rather than 'continuing
violations' that extended into this period.").
30. Id. at 4.
31. Id. Though Turkey ratified the European Convention on Human Rights in
1954, it was not until 1990 that it recognized the ECtHR's jurisdiction. Id. The
RoC ratified the Convention in 1962, and recognized the court in 1980. Id.
Jurisdiction is further complicated by the fact that the TRNC is neither
internationally recognized nor a Convention signatory. Id.
32. Id.
33. Property and Human Rights, supra note 9, at 294.
34. Jenna C. Borders, Another Door Closed: Resort to the European Court of
Human Rights for Relief from the Turkish Invasion of 1974 May No Longer Be
Possible for Greek Cypriots, 36 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 689, 711 (2011). The
204 [Vol. 31:199
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impression, particularly to TRNC supporters, that it views the
RoC as Cyprus's sole governing body, and the TRNC as a puppet of
the Turkish government." Despite these perceptions, certain
ECtHR holdings suggest that the ECtHR has moved closer to
recognizing the legitimacy of the TRNC in recent years, which has
been controversial among Greek Cypriots.36
ECtHR holdings on Cypriot land claims have given rise to
divisive perspectives on both sides." Nonetheless, the court's
holdings have had a tremendous impact on the Cyprus land
question.38 The rights recognized and created by the ECtHR
surrounding post-1974 property distributions in northern Cyprus
are extremely important to the present and future of Cypriot land
disputes.39 Three particularly significant cases have shaped the
ECtHR's jurisprudence on these land claims: Loizidou v. Turkey,
Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey, and Demopoulos v. Turkey.
Loizidou v. Turkey was the first of the modern claims made
by Greek Cypriots against Turkey in the ECtHR.40  This case
opened the door to international redress for Greek Cypriots. The
significance of Loizidou was due, in particular, to the ECtHR's
recognition that: a) property rights may persist after
displacement, and b) such displacement may constitute
"continuing violations" long after the initial violation. Titina
ECtHR in Loizidou held:
The concept of 'jurisdiction' under Article 1 of the Convention is not
restricted to the national territory of the Contracting States . . . . The
obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms set out in the
Convention, derives from the fact of such control whether it be exercised
directly, through its armed forces, or through a subordinate local
administration.
Loizidou v. Turkey, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 513, 530, 535 (1997).
35. Borders, supra note 34, at 710-11; Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, 35
Eur. H.R. Rep. 30 (2001). However, the ECtHR's recognition of the Immovable
Property Commission in Demopoulos v. Turkey signals a move toward the ECtHR's
implicit recognition of the TRNC and its jurisdictional authority over northern
properties. Borders, supra note 34, at 712-13; see also Loizidou, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep.
at 529.
36. See, e.g., Williams & Garel, supra note 29, at 7-8; Demopoulos v. Turkey,
App. No. 46113/99, 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. SE14, T 51 (2010).
37. Property and Human Rights, supra note 9, at 292. Ozersay and Garel
argue that the ECtHR holdings have divided Greek and Turkish Cypriots over a
number of issues, namely whether the Court should be deciding a "political issue,"
whether Greek Cypriots have a genuine grievance or are merely using the Court as
a political platform, and whether the Court is doling punishment based on political
preference. Id. at 295-98, 301-02, 307-09.
38. Id.
39. See Williams & Gurel, supra note 29, at 18-19, 22.
40. See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
41. Williams & Gurel, supra note 29, at 4.
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Loizidou, a Greek Cypriot, grew up in northern Cyprus, and
retained land there after moving to Nicosia.4 After the 1974
invasion, she was no longer able to access her land, and in 1989
she filed a petition with the ECtHR alleging that her rights to
enjoyment of property under Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the
European Convention on Human Rights were violated by Turkish
forces keeping her from her property.43 In 1996, the ECtHR held
that Mrs. Loizidou retained rights to her property, despite
contrary laws in the TRNC, and that she was entitled to damages
for violations of her rights under the European Convention on
Human Rights." Turkey heatedly protested this holding, although
it eventually paid compensatory damages of more than one million
U.S. dollars to Mrs. Loizidou." The significance of Loizidou is
primarily rooted in the fact that it established the ECtHR's
jurisdiction over Turkey, imputed TRNC policy to Turkey, and
recognized ongoing Greek Cypriot land rights.'
In November of 1998, Myra Xenides-Arestis approached the
ECtHR, claiming that the Turkish invasion and subsequent
dispossession from her property in the northern Cyprus town of
Famagusta had violated her rights to respect for home and
peaceful enjoyment of her possessions.4 ' Turkey argued that the
court should not resolve the land issue until the TRNC could
42. Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 23 H.R. Rep 513, 518 (1997).
43. Id. at 513; Borders, supra note 34, at 722; European Convention on Human
Rights, supra note 28, at art.1, Protocol 1 ("Every natural or legal person is entitled
to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for
by law and by the general principles of international law.").
44. Loizidou, 23 H.R. Rep. at 524, 534. While the court found a violation of
Article 1 Protocol 1 of the E.U. Human Rights Convention, it did not find a
violation of Article 8. However, it did not bar future Article 8 claims in similar
future cases. Since in 1974 Loizidou did not reside in Kyrenia, where the disputed
property was located, Turkey's taking of this property did not violate Article 8's
guarantee of a right of respect for one's home. Id. at 534.
45. Turkey Compensates Cyprus Refugee, BBC NEWS (Dec. 2, 2003, 7:24 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hileurope/3257880.stm.
46. Loukis G. Loucaides, The Protection of the Right to Property in Occupied
Territories, 53 INVL & COMP. L.Q. 677, 684 (2004).
47. Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey, App. No. 46347/99, 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. 16, 490,
490 (2005). European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 28, at art. 8. The
Convention states:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance
with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country,
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or




review and make its own determination. The court rejected these
claims and held that the TRNC's mechanism was inadequate to
provide proper relief." Xenides-Arestis took an important step
toward recognition of the TRNC as a body capable of
administering a legitimate remedy for Greek Cypriot grievances
when the ECtHR held that the TRNC, through Turkey, was
required to "introduce a remedy which secures the effective
protection of the rights laid down in article 8 of the Convention
and article 1 of Protocol No.1 in relation to the present applicant
as well as in respect of all similar applications pending before the
Court.""
By compelling the TRNC government to create a viable
mechanism to respond to property grievances, Xenides-Arestis held
the TRNC's Immovable Property Commission to a higher
standard, and set the stage for the 2010 case Demopoulos v.
Turkey, in which the ECtHR rejected the application of several
dispossessed Greek Cypriots." Notably, the ECtHR stated that it
would not hear the case until the claimants had exhausted local
remedies through the IPC, pursuant to the court's instructions in
Xenides-Arestis." The applicants argued unsuccessfully that since
the TRNC was an illegal entity, it did not have the legal authority
to establish domestic remedies52 and "requiring exhaustion"
through the TRNC "lent legitimacy to an illegal occupation" of
Cyprus.' Further, the applicants argued that since the IPC was a
product of an authority widely resented and distrusted by Greek
Cypriots, that it was not an acceptable form of relief.' Ultimately,
the court found the IPC remedy viable and required its
48. Id.
49. Xenides-Arestis, 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. 16, at 490; see also Williams & Gurel,
supra note 29, at 7-8 (affirming that recent court decisions have legitimized the
TRNC).
50. Xenides-Arestis, 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. 16, at 490; Rhodri C. Williams,
Demopoulos v. Turkey (Eur. Ct. H.R.), Introductory Note, 49 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 816, 816 (2010).
51. Demopoulos v. Turkey, App. No. 46113/99, 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. SE14, 1 51
(2010). Demopoulos does not necessarily represent a departure from precedent, but
merely "an attempt to return the property issue to the political sphere" after many
years of litigation. Williams & Girel, supra note 29, at 11.
52. Demopoulos, 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. SE14 at I 58, 92. "Many property owners
felt unable to submit to, or effectively collaborate with, an occupying power in such
a way." Id. at 58. However, "the mere fact that there is an illegal occupation
does not deprive all administrative or putative legal or judicial acts therein of any
relevance under the Convention." Id. at 94.
53. Id. at 92.




The Demopoulos decision was important for a number of
reasons. First, the decision foreclosed a remedy that had the
jurisdictional reach to compel enforcement within the TRNC,
something that could not be accomplished through local
litigation.' Second, in Demopoulos the ECtHR took a step toward
acknowledging the existence of present occupants' competing
rights to the property in question." The decision also gave
significant latitude to TRNC authorities to determine policies for
compensation or restitution in IPC practice.' This discretionary
recognition challenged one of the more extreme of the Greek
Cypriot political positions: that full restitution of all land was the
fundamental right of dispossessed Greek Cypriots."
The ECtHR has made significant strides in recognizing that
dispossessed persons retain rights to their property." In addition,
the ECtHR has established a framework for evaluating the
55. Id. at 98.
56. See, e.g., Case C-420/07, Apostolides v. Orams, 2009 E.C.R. 1-3571 1 1
(granting relief through litigation in the European Court system, after claimant
could not have verdict enforced by the Republic of Cyprus court system or in the
United Kingdom).
57. Williams & Girel, supra note 29, at 1; see also id. at 18 (arguing that "the
passage of time" from 1974 to the present, and the failure of the TRNC and the
RoC's political leadership to arrive at a negotiated resolution may have "eroded the
validity of Greek Cypriot claims"; and that certain protections under Article 8 of
the European Convention on Human Rights may extend to current users of the
contested properties). To this end, Demopoulos states:
[T]he Court finds itself faced with cases burdened with a political,
historical and factual complexity flowing from a problem that should have
been resolved . . . . This reality, as well as the passage of time and the
continuing evolution of the broader political dispute must inform the
Court's interpretation and application of the Convention which cannot, if it
is to be coherent and meaningful, be either static or blind to concrete
factual circumstances.
Demopoulos, 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. SE14 at 85 (2010). In its petition, the respondent
government stated, and the ECtHR agreed, that the new IPC law, pursuant to the
holding in Xenides-Arestis, "was designed to establish a fair balance between these
conflicting rights." Id. at 52.
58. Id. at 1 116. Williams, supra note 50, at 15.
59. Demopoulos, 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 91 116. The court remarked:
[Slome 35 years after the applicants, or their predecessors in title, left
their property, it would risk being arbitrary and injudicious for it to
attempt to impose an obligation on the respondent State to effect
restitution in all cases, or even in all cases save those in which there is a
material impossibility, a suggested condition put forward by the applicants
and intervening Government which discounts all legal and practical
difficulties barring the permanent loss or destruction of the property.
Id.
60. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
208 [Vol. 31:199
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adequacy of local remedies,6 1 and has sought to engage domestic
political leadership and civil society in the resolution of on-going
land conflicts.6 2 However, the foreclosure of the ECtHR as a viable
international forum after Demopoulos encouraged one Cypriot
claimant to seek redress through another international forum, the
ECJ.
B. The European Court of Justice
The ECJ is a significantly less traveled route for Greek
Cypriot claimants than the ECtHR, and there is little indication
that this court will become a more popular or accessible venue.
Nonetheless, it bears mentioning due to the complications that
ECJ engagement has created for establishing a consistent regional
approach to the Cyprus land problem, and the impact of the ECJ's
most significant case, Apostolides v. Orams, on foreign holders of
Cypriot property.'
In 2003, a Greek Cypriot man named Meletis Apostolides
returned to the North to find that a British couple, the Orams, was
occupying his property." The Orams had purchased Apostolides's
land in good faith and built a vacation home on the plot.' In 2004,
Apostolides sued the Orams in the district court of Nicosia, RoC,
seeking repossession of his land.' The court found in favor of
Apostolides, but lacked the capacity to directly enforce the holding
in the TRNC." Apostolides then turned to the English court
system to enforce the judgment.' On appeal, the Court of Justice
(of England and Wales) referred the case to the ECJ, which upheld
the judgment by the Republic of Cyprus, and denied the Orams'
claim that defective service of process gave English courts a basis
to refuse to recognize or enforce the Cyprus court's verdict." In
addition to granting Mr. Apostolides rights to his land, the court
mandated that the Orams demolish the villa they built and pay
61. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
63. Case C-420/07, Apostolides v. Orams, 2009 E.C.R. 1-3571 $ 21, 26. Around
2004, the TRNC economy was largely driven by property development. DODD,
supra note 2, at 256.
64. Thomas D. Grant, Introductory Note to the European Court of Justice (GC):
Apostolides v. Orams, 48 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 788, 788 (2009). In 2003, the
TRNC government opened the borders between the RoC and TRNC for Greek
Cypriots to visit the land from which they had fled. DODD, supra note 2, at 236-37.
65. Grant, supra note 64, at 788.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Case C-420/07, Apostolides v. Orams, 2009 E.C.R. 1-3571 21, 29-31.
69. Grant, supra note 64, at 788-89.
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Apostolides back rent for the time that they had occupied the
land."
Apostolides recognized, as the ECtHR had done in Loizidou
and Xenides-Arestes, that land rights persist beyond
displacement." Yet, Apostolides changed the stakes significantly
by creating an avenue for Greek Cypriot claimants to pursue
foreign and third party buyers in order to seek redress.72
Apostolides demonstrates the potential vulnerabilities of foreign
investors in contested properties, and internationalizes the
problem of the Cypriot land dispute. Though the ECJ route is not
a frequent venue for these types of claims, Apostolides also
highlights the lengths to which Cypriot claimants may go to regain
access to their land rights, and the complex legal avenues that
may be available to the most determined."
C. Domestic Remedies Remain Inadequate
Though these international legal forums are imperfect
solutions to a widespread and systematic set of grievances, the
ECtHR and ECJ have filled gaps where domestic remedies have
been inadequate." Yet, the TRNC and RoC do have specific
policies dealing with property rights of the dispossessed. Though
these policies are not comprehensive, they represent important
efforts to address the grievances locally.
The TRNC established the Immovable Property Commission
(IPC) in 2003 and modified it after the ECtHR's decision in
Xenides-Arestis. The IPC officially began its operations on March
17, 2006. As of October 2012, 3,839 applications had been filed
with the IPC; 272 have been concluded through friendly
settlement and 7 through formal hearings. Although the ECtHR
70. Apostolides, 2009 E.C.R. 1-3571 at 26.
71. See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 65 and 68.
74. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
75. Xenides-Arestis, 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. 16 at 490, 493. Prior to the IPC, the
TRNC Constitution, enacted in May 1985, attempted to codify a formal transfer of
property ownership. TRNC CONSTITUTION, art. 159 (1)(b)-(c) (TRNC). Article
159(1)(b) provides that all immovable properties, buildings, and installations which
were found or legally considered abandoned or ownerless on February 13, 1975 and
which were within the boundaries of the TRNC on November 15, 1983 are to be
considered the property of the TRNC, regardless of how they are registered with
the Land Registry Office. Id.
76. IMMOVABLE PROPERTY COMMISSION, http:www.tamk.gov.ct.tr/english/




has found the IPC to be a viable local remedy, and the IPC itself
claims to be founded on the "principles of bi-zonality and bi-
communality,"" many Greek Cypriots struggle with the idea of
submitting to a jurisdiction that is not recognized locally or
internationally." Moreover, IPC policy favors compensation over
restitution, which many Greek Cypriots view as an unacceptable
exchange.o Procedurally, Greek Cypriots have complained that
the IPC is costly and unduly burdensome." Nevertheless, the IPC,
after its modification pursuant to Xenides-Arestis, has been the
most viable local mechanism, and, barring a further extension, its
December 2013 closure will leave property claimants with no
domestic recourse.82
Though Turkish Cypriots seeking to reclaim property in the
South occurs less frequently, the RoC has established policies for
dealing with abandoned Turkish Cypriot properties.' The RoC
formally regards Turkish Cypriots as legal owners of their
property in government controlled areas, despite the 1991
enactment of a policy that places these properties under
government custodianship.84 The RoC maintains the option of
restitution for Turkish Cypriot lands, but only if the Turkish
Cypriot applicant has resided in the RoC for six months or more-
a policy which poses significant burdens for many potential
Turkish Cypriot claimants.'
These different approaches to land rights and obligations
have also been reflected in each government's negotiating stance
78. Id.
79. See Demopoulos, 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. SE14 at 183 ("The Court recalls that
applicants have not infrequently been required to exhaust domestic remedies even
where they did not choose voluntarily to place themselves under the jurisdiction of
the .. . State . . . ."); see also Williams, supra note 50, at 842 (acknowledging that
the intervening Government's argument before the ECtHR discussed territorial-
restriction, as well as the problem for Greek Cypriots required to utilize the
remedies of a jurisdiction to which they do not submit).
80. Sert, supra note 5, at 248. Thus far, the IPC has paid the equivalent of over
100 million U.S. dollars in compensation. In two cases it ruled for exchange and
compensation, in one case it ruled for full restitution, in five cases it ruled for
restitution and compensation, and in one case it ruled for partial restitution.
IMMOVABLE PROPERTY COMMISSION, supra note 76.
81. Demopoulos, 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. SE14 at 171, 173.
82. See Press Release, Turkish Rep. of N. Cyprus, supra note 23; Demopoulos,
50 Eur. H.R. Rep. SE14 at 176-77 (2010). The ECtHR initially found the IPC to be
inadequate, which prompted the reforms mandated by Xenides-Arestis. Xenides-
Arestis, 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. 16 at 499 (2011).
83. See BRIDGING THE PROPERTY DIVIDE, supra note 21, at 3.
84. Id. at 3. This measure prohibits the sale, exchange, or transfer of
abandoned properties, without the consent of the custodian. Id.
85. Sert, supra note 5, at 249.
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in the long process of Cypriot settlement negotiations."
D. Settlement Negotiations Have Yet To Be Successful
Political negotiations have been ongoing in Cyprus since
1975.7 Land continues to be a central source of contention
between Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders. Each side has
intricate and diverse positions, and these positions have
complicated settlement efforts and highlighted the crux of
property conflicts in Cyprus." It is helpful to illuminate, as much
as possible, some of the primary positions on either side."
The RoC seeks restitution of land claims, freedom of return,
and reinstatement of original property rights for displaced Greek
Cypriots. 0 In the RoC outcome, the Greek Cypriot state would
retain at least seventy-five percent of the land on the island,
restoring as much as possible of the pre-1974 land distribution.9'
Furthermore, the RoC insists that it should remain the only
internationally recognized, independent, and sovereign
government in Cyprus,9 2 representing both Greek and Turkish
Cypriots." Structurally, the RoC would like to maintain a unified
state with a strong federal system. 4
Conversely, the TRNC has advocated for restricted access to
displaced persons," as well as a system of "global compensation
and exchange," which does not include restitution of Greek Cypriot
lands in the North.9 6 The TRNC wants an assurance that Turkish
Cypriots have continued access to land and resources, and that the
TRNC retains twenty-nine percent or more of the island's total
86. Id. at 254.
87. DODD, supra note 2, at 91-223. There is a perspective among some scholars
that political leaders have compromised negotiations through aggressively divisive
positions and an interest in reaping personal and political benefits rather than a
genuine attempt to reach an agreement. See A. Marco Turk, The Negotiation
Culture of Lengthy Peace Processes: Cyprus as an Example of Spoiling that Prevents
a Final Solution, 31 LOY. L.A. INTL & COMP. L. REV. 327, 337-42 (2009).
88. Property and Human Rights, supra note 9, at 292-93.
89. Id.
90. Sert, supra note 5, at 254; Property and Human Rights, supra note 9, at
293.
91. Ahmet Sozen & Kudret Ozersay, The Annan Plan: State Succession or
Continuity, 43 MIDDLE EASTERN STUD. 125, 126 (2007) [hereinafter Annan Plan];
Property and Human Rights, supra note 9, at 293. In addition, the RoC's position
is that Turkish settlers should return to Turkey. Id. at 128.
92. Property and Human Rights, supra note 9, at 293.
93. Id.
94. Annan Plan, supra note 91, at 127.
95. Id. at 128.
96. Property and Human Rights, supra note 9, at 292.
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land mass.97 The TRNC argues that bizonality should preserve the
distribution of land after 1974 and allow for Turkish Cypriots to
remain the majority in the North." Structurally, the TRNC favors
the creation of two sovereign states, with the TRNC acting as an
independent sovereign." Contemporary negotiations have
unsuccessfully attempted to reconcile these two positions.o
The contemporary era of U.N.-sponsored negotiations
between the TRNC and the RoC began in 2001.0 These
negotiations contributed to the formation of the "Annan Plan," the
most recent version of which, "Annan V," was widely viewed by
regional and international actors as the most comprehensive and
sophisticated solution to the political dispute in Cyprus.o2 Despite
this perception, Annan V was complicated from the outset by
international actors exerting pressure over the two communities"
and effectively overshadowing non-elite citizens' access to the
97. Annan Plan, supra note 91, at 128.
98. Property and Human Rights, supra note 9, at 292.
99. Id.
100. DODD, supra note 2, at 223-68.
101. Id. at 212. Talks between the leaders of the two Cypriot communities have
been occurring intermittently since Turkey's invasion in 1974. Id. at 91-223. For
the purposes of this Note, I will focus only on the most recent rounds of
negotiations, which culminated in Annan V.
102. See DAVID HANNAY, CYPRUS: THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION 220 (2005).
Annan V included three primary property provisions meant to address the
inequities created by the 1974 invasion: territorial adjustments, one-third rule,
and significant improvement. Sert, supra note 5, at 250. Adjusting the territorial
mass of the TRNC in the plan would ostensibly return properties to more than half
of those displaced in 1974. Id. at 256 n.9. The one-third rule provided that Greek
and Turkish Cypriots who had been dispossessed of property-but were not eligible
for restitution based upon the territorial adjustments-could reclaim up to one-
third of their property value and area, and be paid compensation for the remainder,
subject to certain conditions. Id. The current user of a property could claim
significant improvements, if they had been made during the period of displacement,
prior to Dec. 31, 2002. Id. This was conditioned upon the current owner paying
compensation in order to gain legal title to the property. Id. In addition, the
Annan Plan provided for the creation of a property commission that promoted
compensation and global property exchange. Id.
103. VAN COUFOUDAKIS, CYPRUS: A CONTEMPORARY PROBLEM IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 35 (2006). The U.S. embassy in Nicosia allegedly distributed "project
funds" only to groups and individuals who were in favor of the passage of Annan V.
Id. Turkey's attempts to gain membership in the E.U. have had an impact on
Turkey's relationship to the negotiations. See Patrick R. Hugg, Accession
Aspirations Degenerate: A New Chapter for Turkey and the E. U., 9 WASH. U. GLOB.
STUD. L. REV. 225, 255-58 (2010). The E.U.'s attempt to provide negotiating
incentives for the parties was compromised by tying the RoC's membership bid "[tlo
the negotiation process for resolution of the conflict, but disengag[ing] it from an
absolute requirement that such a resolution be reached . . . ." Thomas Diez et al.,
The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Transformative Power of
Integration, 60 INT'L ORG. 563, 576 (2006).
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negotiations.o'0 This facilitated an additional layer of inequalities
and compromised Greek Cypriot trust in the settlement process. 05
The Annan Plan proposed territorial adjustment and return
for a substantial portion of displaced Greek Cypriots; however,
referendum voters perceived inadequate security infrastructure to
create safe return, as well as unacceptable political and economic
power shifts." Many Greek Cypriots believed that the Annan
Plan's land provisions would also violate their property rights as
recognized by the ECtHR (prior to 2004) and legitimize Turkey's
illegal occupation.o' The compromises embedded in Annan V were
not strong enough to gain popular support and in some ways
stoked greater divisiveness between the TRNC and RoC
positions. 8 When put to vote, Annan V passed among Turkish
Cypriots generally, but was rejected by over seventy-five percent of
voting Greek Cypriots."
Though Annan V was insufficient to establish local
legitimacy with the Greek Cypriot population, in its wake localized
efforts have emerged in an attempt to bring Greek and Turkish
Cypriots together around a common goal of political resolution.no
In the late 1990s, a group of Greek and Turkish Cypriots began
meeting, first in Oslo and later domestically, to discuss Cyprus's
political problems."' Though these meetings did not ultimately
sway the course of the Annan negotiations, this initiative is
important for a number of reasons. First, the meetings of the
"Oslo Group" demonstrated that numerous individuals from the
"opposed" Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities were willing to
bridge their divisions to negotiate a mutually agreeable outcome.112
Second, the negotiations demonstrated the ability of the group to
identify creative and contextually appropriate solutions that had
104. See Reunification, supra note 11, at 221-22 (detailing how influences from
political and military elites have historically tainted the peace-building process).
105. Id. at 253 ("[T]he fact of the matter is that Greek and Turkish Cypriots for
the most part do not trust each other. . . .").
106. Sert, supra note 5, at 250-51; COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 103, at 39-40.
107. COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 103, at 40.
108. Id. at 38. The elitist approach taken to the Annan negotiations did not
create enough local trust to overcome the lingering prejudices and fraught history
between the two communities. See Reunification, supra note 11, at 217-18.
109. COUFOUDAKIS, supra note 103, at 38.
110. See Reunification, supra note 11, at 222-28.
111. Id. Similar movements have emerged through other localized initiatives.
OLIVER WOLLEH, BERGHOF RES. CTR. FOR CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICT MGMT., LOCAL
PEACE CONSTITUENCIES IN CYPRUS: REPORT NO. 8, at 6-12 (2001). The bi-
communal Conflict Resolution Trainer Group began in 1993, and by 1997 included
over 1,500 people facilitating reconciliation programs. Id.
112. See Reunification, supra note 11, at 227-28.
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not been used in negotiations with political elites."' The Oslo
Group drafted a number of bi-communal and mutually acceptable
solutions to the conflict and land dilemma."' This process was a
strong alternative to the status quo practice of confining
negotiations to political elites."' Third, because the solutions
proposed came from both of the affected communities, they had
more local legitimacy than solutions cultivated by an external
body."6 Unfortunately, political elites failed to take such
grassroots initiatives seriously, and the recommendations of the
Oslo Group have not been included in the broader settlement
117process.
More recently, a Greek Cypriot named Mike Tymvios reached
a private agreement with the IPC over fifty-one plots of land
owned by his company in the northern village of Tymvou."'
Tymvios initiated suit against Turkey at the ECtHR, which was
dropped in 2007 after Tymvios and the Government of Turkey
informed the court that Tymvios had reached a settlement with
the IPC to exchange ownership of the northern land with land in
the South that had belonged to the Turkish Cypriot Muslim
Schools of Larnaca."' The ECtHR determined the agreement to be
valid, and despite controversy within the RoC, the RoC cabinet
approved the land swap in July 2012.1' Though it remains to be
seen whether land swaps such as this will be more widely
practiced, cooperation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots
facilitated through the IPC indicates the potential for mutually
agreeable solutions to land grievances, and the possibility of a
113. Id. See Things Fall Apart, supra note 25, at 860. Atuahene explains that
cost-benefit analysis with regard to political transition and property policy is
different for political elites than it is for non-elite persons. Id.
114. See Reunification, supra note 11, at 228.
115. Id. ("Nevertheless, it is informative to see what they accomplished in the
process, especially when comparing their success at the level of [elite] diplomacy
with the historical failures of the elite diplomats . . . .").
116. See id. at 218-19 (arguing that outside powers have dominated the
negotiations and compromised Cypriot ability to determine their own fate).
117. See id. at 243-44 (describing how, in the wake of the completion of the Oslo
Group's report, committee members sought to present their findings to government
officials, the press, and those on both sides of the conflict but were rejected and
criticized for their "pointless psychological effort").
118. Eugenia Michaelidou Dev. Ltd. v. Turkey, App. No. 16163/90, Eur. Ct. H.R.
11(2008).
119. Id. at 1[ 13-15; Stefanos Evripidou, IPC Insists Tymvios Case Sets
Precedent, CYPRUS MAIL (July 12, 2012), www.cyprus-mail.com/Cyprus/ipc-insists-
tymvios-case-sets-precedent/20120712#comments.
120. Eugenia Michaelidou Dev. Ltd., Eur. Ct. H.R. at 16; Greek Cyprus




property commission playing a greater role to facilitate remedies
between private parties.
Currently, the remedies that exist for Cypriot property
claimants remain insufficient. Furthermore, the status of current
occupants' rights is far too uncertain to provide any real
guarantees for these persons.' 2' The uncertainties of property
ownership in the TRNC have created serious problems for foreign
property purchasers, dispossessed claimants, and those currently
residing on contested land.'22 This uncertainty has had a
measurable impact on the TRNC's economy and has inspired
Greek Cypriot claimants to pursue even more aggressive means to
lay claim to their northern land rights, including litigation in
foreign jurisdictions."'
II. Resolving Land Grievances in Cyprus: Identifying Gaps
and Ways Forward
The precedent established by the ECtHR, ECJ, and IPC has
recognized competing rights and responsibilities with regard to
contested Cypriot properties."' As noted, in the wake of the IPC
closing, there will be limited mechanisms to fill the gap and
resolve the issue of competing land rights in Cyprus. The
remainder of this Note evaluates the efficacy and issues that arise
from a) pursuing further litigation, b) navigating the various local,
regional, and international interests in negotiated settlement, and
121. See Rebecca Bryant, A Dangerous Trend in Cyprus, 235 MIDDLE EAST REP.
30, 37 (2005); Greek Cypriots 'Can Reclaim Land', BBC NEWS (Apr. 28, 2009, 11:59
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8022238.stm.
122. See Case C-420/07, Apostolides v. Orams, 2009 E.C.R. 1-357154; see also
Nigel Howarth, Cypriot Real Estate Sales in Freefall, CYPRUS PROP. NEWS (Oct. 5,
2011), http://www.news.cyprus-property-buyers.com/2011/10/05/cypriot-real-estate-
sales-in-freefall/id=009044; Nigel Howarth, Many Properties Will Remain Unsold,
CYPRUS PROP. NEWS (Oct. 28, 2011), http://www.news.cyprus-property-
buyers.com/2011/10/28/many-properties-will-remain-unsold.
123. See Class Action Complaint at 2, Toumazou v. Turkey, (No. 1:09-CV-01967),
2009 WL 3453887 (D.D.C. 2009); Class Action Complaint at 12, Fiouris v. TRNC,
(No. 1:10-CV-01225), 2010 WL 7378418 (D.D.C. 2010); Kerin Hope, Bank Caught in
Crossfire in Property Battle, FIN. TIMES (June 2, 2005),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/1/bed4a57c-d2d8-11d9-bead-00000e2511c8.html
#axzz2AkOjLu69; Poly Pantelides, Lawyer Tells Greek Cypriots to Seek Redress in
American Courts, CYPRUS MAIL, Feb. 23, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 3557059;
see also Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg & Feldman
Fine Arts, Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 279-93 (7th Cir. 1990) (detailing a suit brought by
the RoC to recover antiquities stolen from a church in Cyprus that later surfaced in
an art gallery in Indiana).
124. Williams & Giirel, supra note 29, at 8 (recognizing the confusion that
remains regarding the relationship between the ECtHR's Demopoulos decision and
the ECJs holding in Apostolides).
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c) the possibility of establishing a cooperative land policy
mechanism in the interim of a broader political settlement. These
options are not mutually exclusive, and in practice, there is likely
to be significant overlap between them."' Yet, disaggregating
these categories and evaluating these options distinctly
illuminates some of the central land tensions in Cyprus and the
benefits and challenges of each path. Namely, this analysis asks
and seeks to identify how land remedies in Cyprus can be
constructed in a way that recognizes the rights established by the
ECtHR, provides some relief for ongoing grievances, despite a lack
of optimism for political settlement, and facilitates local legitimacy
through bizonal cooperation. Of course, any viable remedy must
take into account the incredible complexity of the political
situation, as well as the great personal, cultural, and regional
significance of the disputed land."
A. Litigation Is Not an Ideal Option for Resolving Claims
Going Forward
Litigation has been an imperfect tool for addressing
widespread claims such as land disputes in Cyprus."' The RoC
federal courts are unable to enforce judgments in the TRNC, and
many Greek Cypriots view using TRNC courts as an implicit
125. See supra notes 50-59, 101-110 and accompanying text.
126. See DODD, supra note 2, at 277; Hugg, supra note 103, at 233, 244-49
(discussing the complicated role of Cyprus in Turkey's E.U. accession bids).
One could hardly construct a "problem case" more fully illustrative of the
complexity of world politics in our time than the real-life case of Cyprus,
that island beset by traditional antipathies between ethnic groups, torn by
the pulls and pressures exerted by neighboring states interested in the
fate of its constituent nationalities, agonized by the conflict between
majority rule and minority rights,... and exposed to the political winds of
both the East-West and the North-South struggles.
Benjamin M. Meier, Reunification of Cyprus: The Possibility of Peace in the Wake of
Past Failure, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 455, 455 (2001). The process of establishing a
solution includes a complex discussion of the future governance structure that is
beyond the scope of this Note. See DODD, supra note 2, at 259-66; see also supra
note 9 and accompanying text; IRON, supra note 1, at 11-12 ("There are not ...
simply two ethnic communities in conflict in Cyprus, for within each ethnic
community are several political groupings with radically opposed ideas on political
life-moderate nationalists, more extreme nationalists, and several kinds of
leftists.").
127. See, e.g., REBECCA BRYANT & METE HATAY, GLOBAL POL. TRENDS CTR.,
SUING FOR SOVEREIGNTY: PROPERTY, TERRITORY, AND THE EU's CYPRUS PROBLEM 1
(2009), available at http://www.gpotcenter.org/dosyalar/PolicyBrieff.pdf (explaining
that property disputes that have resulted in recent lawsuits have yielded
inconsistent results with no clear indication of a central "position" on the legal or
political status of these lands "not controlled by the government of Cyprus").
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affirmation of TRNC sovereignty and jurisdiction." Further,
though litigation has established important precedents, it cannot
of its own accord create and maintain the institutions necessary to
resolve the Cyprus land problem.12' However, since no local
remedy pursuant to the requirements of Xenides-Arestis and
Demopoulos will be available once the IPC closes, it is likely that
claimants will continue to turn to external forums for resolution
where they are accessible.
The ECtHR's holding in Demopoulos was based upon the fact
that a local remedy existed in the IPC and provided sufficient
potential for relief to claimants."' Once the domestic remedy is no
longer operable, Greek Cypriots may attempt to return to the
ECtHR to seek relief due to their earlier recognition and
successes.1"' However, four primary considerations make this
option problematic: the ECtHR's recognition of competing
property rights in Demopoulos, the pressure put on the RoC and
TRNC by the ECtHR to develop localized forms of redress, a pre-
Demopoulos backlog of Greek Cypriot property cases filed with the
ECtHR, and the boundaries of the ECtHR's mandate.
First, Demopoulos acknowledged the competing claims held
by current occupants of the contested properties."' Demopoulos
recognized that continuing to uphold Greek Cypriot property
rights despite the passage of over thirty years could have a
detrimental or inequitable effect on the rights of those who
currently occupy the land."' Further, Demopoulos stated that
128. See Demopoulos v. Turkey, App. No. 46113/99, 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. SE14 92
(2010) (indicating that most of the objections raised by the Greek Cypriots derive
from the argument that exhausting local remedies offers the illegal occupation
implicit legitimacy); see also Sert, supra note 5, at 248 (characterizing the Greek
Cypriots as "afraid" of "international recognition of a TRNC institution").
129. See supra notes 50-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of past
litigation, such as Xenides-Arestis and Demopoulos, which established precedent
recognizing the TRNC and IPC as bodies capable of adjudicating adequate domestic
remedies. However, the IPC will discontinue operation by 2013. See Press Release,
TRNC, supra note 23.
130. Demopoulos, 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. SE14 at 1 127.
131. See, e.g., Sert, supra note 5, at 248. The ECtHR found that "Cypriot
national Titina Loizidou's right 'to the peaceful enjoyment of (her) possessions'
guaranteed under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was violated by Turkey."
The court awarded Ms. Loizidou 1.2 million euros in damages. Id. Prior to the
decision in Demopoulos, there were hundreds of Cypriot property claims pending
before the ECtHR. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the
United Nations Operation in Cyprus, 1 8, U.N. Doc. S/2005/353 (May 27, 2005).
132. See Demopoulos, 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. SE14 at $1 83-85.
133. Id. But see LOUKIS G. LOUCAIDES, ESSAYS ON THE DEVELOPING LAW OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 133 (1995). Loucaides argues that the passage of time does not
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unconditional support for a Greek Cypriot right of return was not
a requirement of the Convention and, in fact, may lead to further
human rights violations.'" Demopoulos's concern for the passage
of time and the rights of current occupants indicates that the
ECtHR route may not proceed as favorably for Greek Cypriots as
it has in the past.'
Second, the ECtHR has clearly stated its preference that the
claimants seek localized forms of redress.'" The ECtHR's ongoing
frustration with Cyprus's leaders' inability to negotiate a
settlement is evident through its admonition in Demopoulos that
the court is once again hearing a case "flowing from a problem that
should have been resolved by all parties assuming full
responsibility for finding a solution on a political level."'37 Even
though the obligation is stated directly in the European
Convention for Human Rights, both Xenides-Arestis and
Demopoulos clearly established that local redress was an
obligation of the state parties.'"8 It is unlikely that the ECtHR will
be keen to revisit this determination. 13 9
Third, the ECtHR's interest in relieving some of the backlog
of Greek Cypriot property cases in the ECtHR system may have
partially motivated the preference for local redress voiced in
pardon human rights violations:
The forcible transfer of populations and the implantation of settlers are
prohibited by international law and qualify as international crimes. These
methods entail by definition long[-]term situations. If it is accepted a
priori that passage of time legalizes the effects of such methods the role of
law becomes pathetic.
Id.
134. Demopoulos v. Turkey, App. No. 46113/99, 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. SE14 [T 116-
17 (2010); Williams & GUrel, supra note 29, at 9.
135. For the argument made by Williams and GUrel that several factors,
including the passage of time, work against the continued validity of the Greek
Cypriots' claims, see Williams & Gurel, supra note 57 and accompanying text.
136. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 28, at art. 35 § 1;
see also Grant, supra note 64, at 789 (explicating that both the ECJ and the ECtHR
have affirmed that judicial systems at the national level have "procedural
autonomy" in adjudicating land disputes in northern Cyprus).
137. Demopoulos, 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. SE14 at f 85.
138. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 28, at art. 35 §1 ("The
Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been
exhausted . . . ."). Demopoulos addressed the capacity of domestic agents to create
appropriate remedies:
[T]he Court maintains its view that it must leave the choice of
implementation of redress for breaches of property rights to contracting
states, who are in the best position to assess the practicalities, priorities[,]
and conflicting interests on a domestic level even in a situation such as
that pertaining in the northern part of Cyprus.




Xenides-Arestis and Demopoulos."" If that is the case, the ECtHR
may be unwilling to reopen the floodgates to further property
litigation.""
Finally, the ECtHR is not mandated to hear any matter that
"is substantially the same as a matter that has already been
examined by the Court or has already been submitted to another
procedure of international investigation or settlement and
contains no relevant new information."'4  If the ECtHR
determines that no "relevant new information" will arise in further
Greek Cypriot property claims, it may refer to its mandate as a
means to encourage local resolution and dissuade future filings of
Cypriot property claims stemming from the 1974 migration.14 3 For
the aforementioned reasons, it is unlikely that the ECtHR will
remain as hospitable to Greek Cypriot property claimants as it
was before Demopoulos.'"
It is possible that the limitations now upon the ECtHR may
inspire applicants to go the route of Meletis Apostolides-to have
judgments enforced by the ECJ through other E.U. member
states.'" However, as a policy matter, wider reliance on this
particular recourse will create litigation burdens for a large group
of foreign nationals who purchased what they believed to be
legitimate titles to land. 4" In addition, because the TRNC is not
recognized by the E.U., this recourse may have little impact for
applicants seeking to enforce claims against Turkish Cypriots.
This form of redress is primarily unsustainable due to procedural
barriers and potential inconsistencies with other jurisprudence on
the issue.
140. Williams & Gurel, supra note 29, at 11-12. For a discussion of the pre-
Demopoulos backlogged cases regarding property rights, see the U.N. Secretary-
General's Report, supra note 131.
141. Cf Williams & Gurel, supra note 29, at 12-13 (arguing that the ECtHR
would be justified in continuing to defer complaints to local mechanisms even if
there were no backlog).
142. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 28, at art. 35 § 2(b).
143. Williams & Gurel, supra note 29, at 12.
144. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
145. For discussion of Apostolides's case and his attempts to bring his land
claims to courts, see supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text; see also Borders,
supra note 34, at 745 (discussing how Apostolides was ultimately able to enforce
these judgments).
146. See Case C-420/07, Apostolides v. Orams, 2009 E.C.R. 1-3571 11 21, 26;
Bruno Waterfield, Landmark Court Ruling Means Britons Could Be Forced to
Return Homes in Northern Cyprus, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 29, 2009),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/cyprus/5242294/Landmark-
court-ruling-means-Britons-could-be-forced-to-return-homes-in-Northern-
Cyprus.html. For background on the building and development boom of abandoned
properties, see DODD, supra note 2, at 256.
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For one thing, most claimants do not possess the resources
required to see a case through the meandering trajectory traced by
Mr. Apostolides." Relying on this course will likely produce a
significant economic and practical burden for many with
legitimate grievances."' Additionally, the ECJ generally requires
that national legal bodies carry out the dictates of the Court. 149
The questions of jurisdiction, enforcement, and recognition of
authority that plagued Mr. Apostolides's case in Nicosia federal
court may replicate themselves in future ECJ judgments that rely
on the cooperation of RoC or TRNC courts.'
Further, it remains unclear what the relationship is between
Apostolides and Demopoulos and how these two cases will be
interpreted side by side in future decisions."' This problematic
inconsistency stems from the fact that Demopoulos requires
redress through a legitimate local remedy (the IPC), whereas
Apostolides allows claimants to sidestep this remedy and have
judgments from RoC courts enforced in other E.U. member states
against occupiers of their land in the TRNC."'
Relying solely on the European Courts may undermine
negotiations and create a problem of inconsistent judgments and
enforcement."' However, in the absence of other viable
mechanisms for redress, individuals will likely continue to seek
relief through whatever forum is available. The ECtHR and ECJ
have recognized that many claimants retain some rights to
property left behind, and, at the very least, have a right to some
form of redress."' Any future resolution for Cypriot land claims
147. See, e.g., BRIDGING THE PROPERTY DIVIDE, supra note 21, at 8 (explaining
that both the Turkish and Greek Cypriots face the prospect of heavy economic
burdens associated with challenging and defending property titles in court).
148. Id.
149. Grant, supra note 64, at 789.
150. See id.
151. Williams & Giirel, supra note 29, at 8. Since the IPC is closing, the vacuum
of local remedies will likely complicate the confusion between these two judgments.
152. For a description of these cases and their disparate outcomes, see supra
notes 50-73 and accompanying text.
153. Williams & GUrel, supra note 29, at 8; see also supra note 37 and
accompanying text.
154. For examples of the varying routes Greek Cypriot claimants have
attempted to regain their land rights within the past several years, see supra note
123.
155. The ECJ has upheld a judgment in Apostolides declaring that Greek
Cypriots maintain land rights in the North and are entitled to damages. See supra
notes 66-70 and accompanying text. The ECtHR upheld Greek Cypriots' rights to
both return and use their land and determined that the Greek Cypriots could claim
damages in Loizidou. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. In Xenides-
Arestis, even though it did not decide on the merits of the case, the ECtHR
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must reflect these rights and reconcile the rights of prior owners
and current occupiers of contested property."
B. Negotiated Settlement Provides a Viable, Though Uncertain,
Solution
There is a viable argument that Cypriot property claims will
not be settled until the dispute between the RoC and TRNC is
effectively negotiated and a political settlement has been
reached."' Relying on negotiated settlement to deal with land
disputes has a number of benefits.
Negotiations will undoubtedly clarify the boundaries of Greek
and Turkish Cypriots' rights and obligations to property," and
develop a consistent interpretation of the principles established by
the European Court judgments."' The ECtHR has long advocated
for the land issue to be resolved through settlement, and the
property regime laid out in the Annan Plan does not contradict
any of the ECtHR's established standards."' The precedent
established by the ECtHR has significantly excised the most
radical proposals from either side, leaving plenty of room for
negotiators to carve out a more specific, sustainable, and concrete
solution."'
Negotiations with the weight and resources of political elites
and governmental structures behind them may also have a better
capacity to develop strong and sustainable enforcement and
compensation structures."' To create land settlements through
determined that the TRNC and Turkey are required to establish and maintain an
institution to which Greek Cypriots can bring land claims. See supra note 49 and
accompanying text.
156. Demopoulos, 50 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 10; Williams, supra note 50, at 818.
157. See Williams & GUrel, supra note 29, at 25. Williams and GUrel argue that
the ECtHR's position in Demopoulos is only significant insofar as it establishes
parameters for resolution of the property issue-excluding the most radical
proposals (i.e., that restitution is called for by the Convention, or on the contrary,
that no compensation or exchange is necessary for widespread takings of Greek
Cypriot property). Id. at 9, 22.
158. Cf. id. at 8.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 23.
161. For a discussion on the range of solutions that ECtHR has left open, see
supra note 157.
162. Williams & Giurel, supra note 29, at 26 (arguing that normalization can
come only through negotiated settlement); see also Loizidou v. Turkey, 23 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 513, 542-43 (1997). Loizidou's preference for localized redress was clearly
stated:
[Ilt is also far from established whether the "TRNC" de facto Government
will survive or not, and if it will, in what form-as a federal or confederal
unit, an independent state, or in some other form .... The final outcome
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other means could remove bargaining tools from both sides, and
may compromise settlement of important questions of
governance.
There are also disadvantages. First and foremost is the
possibility that settlement will not be reached on a timeline that
reflects the interests of either the dispossessed or those who are
tentatively occupying northern properties." Cyprus's political and
social divisions were cut over multiple decades, and, despite many
attempts at settlement, political determinations are not likely to
be resolved quickly in current negotiations.'" The RoC's recent
offshore drilling and Turkey's vocal opposition may further deter
an expedient resolution.'66
Moreover, negotiations that primarily focus on the interests
and cost-benefit calculations of elites may not reflect the needs and
interests of local populations.'67 This kind of miscalculation of
needs and interests across a wider swath of the Greek Cypriot
population may have contributed to the poor response to Annan
of the conflict-in the form of a post facto international or bilateral
settlement-will have to resolve in one way or another the issue of
recognition of the acts of the "TRNC" from the commencement of its
existence, and/or of reversion to the original status prior to such acts.
Id.
163. See Williams & Girel, supra note 29, at 8-9.
164. For example, political negotiations have been ongoing since 1974. Dodd,
supra note 2, at 91-223; see also supra note 87 and accompanying text. Such
lengthy negotiations will only exacerbate the problems the courts have noted in
Demopoulos and Apostolides of the competing rights of the present occupants and
the Greek Cypriots who have been previously dispossessed. See supra notes 56, 62
and accompanying text.
165. See Dan Lindley, Historical, Tactical, and Strategic Lessons from the
Partition of Cyprus, 8 INT'L STUD. PERSP. 224, 235 (2007) (characterizing the
negotiations over the Cyprus problem as "seemingly perpetual"). Optimism about
the most recent round of negotiations has been felt before, to no avail. See, e.g.,
Cyprus: Byzantine Diplomacy, EcoNOMIST, July 26, 1997, at 44 (reflecting
optimism about resolution during the 1997 negotiations); Makarios Droushiotis,
Closest Ever to a Cyprus Deal, CYPRUS MAIL (Nov. 6, 2011), http://www.cyprus-
mail.com/cyprus/closest-ever-cyprus-deal/20111106 (reporting that both sides are
committed to reaching an agreement, and that a source close to negotiations has
indicated that they are closer to a solution than ever before).
166. See Cyprus Begins Controversial Oil and Gas Drilling, BBC NEWS (Sept. 19,
2011, 12:01 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-14968737; Cem Barber,
Turkey Threatens Naval Action Over Cyprus Drilling, FAMAGUSTA GAZETTE (Sept.
6, 2011), http://famagusta-gazette.com/turkey-threatens-naval-action-over-cyprus-
drilling-pl2883-69.htm; Alexia Saoulli, 'Nothing Will Stop Drilling', CYPRUS MAIL
(Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.cyprus-mail.com/cyprus/nothing-will-stop-
drilling/20110817.
167. For a description of the grassroots organization called the Oslo Group,
which did not gain support from political elites, despite its popular backing, see
supra notes 109-117 and accompanying text.
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V.'6 As discussed above, disenfranchising Greek and Turkish
Cypriot populations from the negotiating table forecloses more
localized opportunities at reconciliation and cooperation.'6 In
order to be most effective and equitable, a negotiated settlement,
particularly with regards to property, must create space for the
voices of non-elite Turkish and Greek Cypriots and reflect their
interests. 170
C. Navigating Levels of Interest: Local to International Stakes
and the Challenges of a Top-Down Approach
Establishing a bi-communal land policy, even in the absence
of an overarching political settlement, will require balancing the
interests of multiple stakeholders, from the local to the
international. The international community, including the U.N.,
the E.U., and individual states, has been deeply involved in the
Cyprus conflict and negotiations.' International third party
oversight has facilitated nearly all of the negotiations to the
present.17 Indeed, much of this support has been positive, though
international priorities have complicated the negotiations."'
However, two primary concerns support an argument for limiting
the scope of international intervention with regard to the
resolution of land disputes.
First, the complicated relationship between the E.U. and the
RoC, TRNC, and Turkey provides a stumbling block to successful
settlement.' In the second half of 2012, the RoC is set to hold the
E.U. presidency, which has contributed to concerns about E.U.
bias and whether the E.U. will be able to balance the interests of
both groups during this time."' Turkish Cypriots' perception of
168. CoUFouDAKIS, supra note 103, at 41-42.
169. See supra notes 111-117 and accompanying text.
170. Rethinking, supra note 22, at 466; see also DODD, supra note 2, at 276
(arguing that no settlement option would be viable if Greek Cypriots do not feel
that it is in their interest).
171. See, e.g., supra note 103 and accompanying text.
172. Michele Kambas, U.N. Calls Cyprus Peace Summit in January, REUTERS
(Nov. 2, 2011), http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/11/01/idINIndia-60251720111101;
see also Reunification, supra note 11, at 218-19.
173. See Reunification, supra note 11, at 218-19.
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., Jonathon Burch, Turkey to Freeze E.U. Ties if Cyprus Gets E.U.
Presidency, REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/18/
us-turkey-cyprus-idUSTRE78H20L20110918. Part of the E.U.'s leverage in
assisting with conflict negotiations in Northern Ireland, for instance, was based in
the fact that both Britain and Ireland were members and that the E.U. could utilize
economic incentives as a part of the settlement package. Diez, et al., supra note
103, at 582. Turkey's uncertain E.U. future, the TRNC's lack of recognition, and
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E.U. bias may compromise any attempt to resolve land claims in
which the E.U. or RoC's interests are too widely represented."6
Second, and more generally, is the concern that
internationally developed and administered conflict solutions will
fail to incorporate important local interests and will overlook
significant social inequalities in their design." If an international
or regional third party is to provide successful support for political
and land-based negotiations in Cyprus, it must be able to build a
wider social base beyond political elites and to remember that a
dearth of local, non-elite representation contributed to the failure
of the Annan Plan."' In addition, international attempts to
resolve Cypriot land grievances must draw lessons from the
legitimacy problems embedded in other contexts of external
oversight,7 9 in order to ensure that the mechanism does not
replicate old inequalities and animosities in the TRNC and RoC
legal systems going forward.as
Nevertheless, international involvement in land settlement is
appealing. First, international clout may provide a more definitive
the RoC's impending E.U. presidency create a more challenging landscape for the
E.U.'s involvement. Cf The Insoluble Cyprus Problem: Sad Island Story,
ECONOMIST, Mar. 31, 2011, at 51 (positing that changes in local politics mean long
talks still await the Cypriot leaders in 2013, despite the extensive negotiations that
have already occurred).
176. But see Lindley, supra note 165, at 236 (arguing that the E.U. gave up its
leverage over the RoC when it failed to condition RoC accession to the E.U. on
successful resolution).
177. See supra notes 103, 116.
178. See supra notes 109, 113; Diez, et al., supra note 103, at 581.
179. See Displacement Shock, supra note 12. The property redress mechanism
established by the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) reveals some of the
problems that can arise through international institution building out of conflict.
The mechanism was formulated from the top down with very little local
involvement or input. Bernadette Atuahene, Property and Transitional Justice, 58
UCLA L. REV. 65, 89-90 (2010). This gave one primary agency the exclusive
jurisdiction to address and remedy any unlawful or coerced dispossession of
property rights during the relevant timeframe. PRAXIS, COMMENTS ON UNMIK'S
PROTECTION OF ICCPR-GUARANTEED RIGHTS IN RELATION TO CERTAIN ASPECTS OF
PRIVATE IMMOVABLE PROPERTY CLAIMS RESOLUTION IN Kosovo 3 (2006), available
at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/Praxis.pdf. Consequently,
UNMIK established the standards for restitution and compensation without
sensitivity to the inequities between Albanian and non-Albanian property holders
that were ingrained in prior property arrangements and fomented concerns that
the property mechanism would transcend international oversight and replicate old
inequalities and animosities going forward. Id.
180. PRAXIS, supra note 179, at 3. Also, as UNMIK created a legal property
structure in Kosovo, parallel courts in Serbia continued to deal with property
issues, thus creating a confusing system of parallel, and often contradictory,
judgments. Elena Baylis, Parallel Courts in Post-Conflict Kosovo, 32 YALE J. INT'L
L. 1, 12-13 (2007). See supra notes 114-116 and accompanying text.
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settlement of boundaries and governance issues.'1' Second,
international bodies have a greater arsenal of procedural expertise
to establish mechanisms and enforce property rights, obligations,
and requirements.18' International actors have learned many
lessons through their engagement with other conflict situations,
some of which may be apt for the Cyprus context.'" Furthermore,
third party mediation may facilitate communication between
conflicting parties, improve credibility of a property institution,
and limit the involvement of external interests.'"
The Annan referendum illustrated that even a well-
structured internationally celebrated plan will not succeed without
local legitimacy.'18  While expertise and neutrality are necessary,
international involvement must not proceed at the expense of
representative input.'8 Local legitimacy, to the best that it can be
achieved among both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, is paramount to
successful settlement of the property situation. 7
III. Constructing a Bi-communal and Locally Legitimate
Solution to Move Forward on the Land Issue
The next step for resolving Cypriot land claims must reflect
the rights and obligations of both dispossessed and current
occupiers of contested properties." These will not disappear when
181. See Ronald J. Fisher, Methods of Third-Party Intervention, in THE BERGHOF
HANDBOOK FOR CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION 157, 160-63 (Beatrix Austin et al. eds.,
2011).
182. Id.
183. See, e.g., Hans Das, Restoring Property Rights in the Aftermath of War, 53
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 429, 430 ("In Bosnia and Kosovo, the international community
has experimented with institutional and procedural models to resolve large
numbers of property restitution claims. . . . [Vialuable lessons can be drawn from .
. . the institutional machinery and the procedural mechanics of property restitution
184. HANS J. GIESSMANN & OLIVER WILS, BERGHOF RES. CTR. FOR
CONSTRUCTIVE CONFLICT MGMT., CONFLICT PARTIES' INTERESTS IN MEDIATION 4-5
(2009). International actors may also be able to facilitate the inclusion of divergent
political perspectives, because they do not possess the biases and loyalties that
local actors bring to the table. WOLLEH, supra note 111, at 22.
185. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
186. Baylis, supra note 180, at 11, 48. Competing claims to sovereignty and
legitimacy between the Serbian-state legal system and the internationally
established claims system in Kosovo (controlled primarily by the United Nations
Mission in Kosovo) have created great inconsistency in judgment and enforcement,
and compromised legitimacy of both systems among different segments of society.
Id. Truly representative input must also include participation by non-elites. See
supra note 113.
187. Id.
188. See supra notes 57, 111-117. Despite Turkey's argument that the
negotiations create a bar to Greek Cypriot property claims in the ECtHR, Xenides-
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the IPC ceases its operations, and neither do the grievances that
gave rise to Loizidou's original claim before the ECtHR.189
Comprehensive negotiated settlement is the ideal outcome.'
However, history has demonstrated that this solution may not
come to pass within a reasonable timeframe."' Further, in prior
Cypriot negotiations, international arbiters have demonstrated a
preference for dealing only with political elites.192 This has
prevented many non-elite sectors of society from presenting
creative alternatives."' Greek and Turkish Cypriots should not
have to wait for an uncertain political settlement to exercise rights
or clarify obligations to property that they have previously owned
or currently inhabit."
Given the uncertainty of negotiated settlement, the best
contemporary solution for Cypriot property disputes is the
formation of a bi-communal body, incorporating elements from the
IPC and Annan Plan. This body, however, must have local
legitimacy, participation from both Greek and Turkish Cypriots,
and it must represent the interests of all persons who lay claim to
contested land.'" An alternate local remedy could take many
forms, which is both a strength and a weakness." Local input can
positively shape the structure and form of the mechanism;
however, deciding on the most appropriate mechanism and
mandate may create additional conflicts.197 Despite the challenges,
the well-documented relationship between property grievances
and social unrest provides a strong incentive for establishing some
Arestis held that settlement negotiations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots
could not serve as a justification for violations of the Convention. Xenides-Arestis
v. Turkey, App. No. 46347/99, 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. 16, 491, 496-98 (2011).
189. See supra notes 40, 133.
190. See supra notes 162-163.
191. See supra notes 57, 63, 87 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 112, 113, 117, 178 and accompanying text.
193. Id.
194. Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey, App. No. 46347/99, 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. 16, 491,
496-98 (2011) (showing the difficulties Cypriots faced due to uncertainties).
195. See supra notes 57, 108, 112-117 and accompanying text.
196. See Albrecht Schnabel, One Size Fits All? Focused Comparison and Policy-
Relevant Research on Violently Divided Societies, in RESEARCHING VIOLENTLY
DIVIDED SOCIETIES: ETHICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 193, 205 (Marie Smyth
& Gillian Robinson eds., 2001); WOLLEH, supra note 111, at 21-22. Establishing
the structure of the Conflict Resolution Trainer Group was complicated by
questions about appropriate representation. For instance, equal (fifty percent
Greek Cypriot, fifty percent Turkish Cypriot) versus representative (reflecting the
majority Greek Cypriot and minority Turkish Cypriot population demographics)
membership in the group; as well as how best to represent both left-wing and right-
wing political perspectives. Id.
197. Wolleh, supra note 111, at 21-22.
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form of redress.'" Outbreaks of unrest in the wake of the Annan V
referendum highlight the fact that the absence of recourse for
aggrieved persons increases the threat of further violence."'
Furthermore, the commission must be tasked with
reconciling the holdings of prior courts, and embedding the rights
of displaced and current property holders into both a broad land
policy and a system for addressing individual grievances.200 It is
essential that the complicated calculations about
property-restitution, compensation, and mobility-reflect the
interests of dispossessed and current occupiers of Cypriot land,
and provide opportunities for reconciliation on smaller scales. 01
This mechanism should be structured as an administrative
land redress commission, like the IPC or the commission
envisioned by the Annan Plan,"' but should have an
administrative board that is more representative of the bi-
communal interests of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots.' In this
way, the policies established by the commission could create the
parameters for negotiation of wider political territory disputes."
In addition, this form of redress creates opportunities for non-
elites to contribute meaningfully to the settlement of an important
aspect of the broader political dispute and provides opportunities
to facilitate mutually beneficial exchanges between displaced
Greek and Turkish Cypriots."' The interest and capacity to create
such* a bi-communal, reconciliatory commission already exists in
the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities."0
Due to the aforementioned concerns about political elites
dominating the process, it makes sense to organize the commission
198. Things Fall Apart, supra note 25, at 838-41 (discussing the myriad of
literature on the relationship between property-related grievances and social
unrest); see also Bernadette Atuahene, Legal Title to Land as an Intervention
Against Urban Poverty in Developing Nations, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1109,
1130 (2004) (arguing that legal title to land can remove structural barriers that
contribute to cycles of poverty).
199. See supra note 198; see also Bryant, supra note 121, at 30.
200. See supra note 57. For more on the complications of restitution and
property distribution and compensation mechanisms, see Megan J. Ballard, Post-
Conflict Property Restitution: Flawed Legal and Theoretical Foundations, 28
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 462, 474-84, 495 (2010); Bernadette Atuahene, From
Reparation to Restoration: Moving Beyond Restoring Property Rights to Restoring
Political and Economic Invisibility, 60 SMU L. REV. 1419, 1444, 1470 (2007).
201. See supra note 57, 200; Bryant, supra note 121, at 30.
202. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 53, 79.
204. See supra notes 112-117 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 111-120 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 111-117 and accompanying text.
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through a neutral third party.20 7  That said, local bi-communal
representatives should determine the commission's policies,
mandate, and authority. 208 International stakeholders,
particularly the U.N., can offer a great body of procedural
expertise and a sense of neutrality so long as third party interests
are not prioritized.209 In this way, third party international actors
may be well situated to recruit commission members and establish
the skeletal structure of the institution.10 In addition,
international involvement can provide incentives for cooperation
that may not otherwise exist.211
By limiting international actors to the basic organization of
the commission, and leaving local actors to establish the policies
and parameters of the commission's operations, the benefits of
international involvement may be maintained, while the
legitimacy hurdles of international oversight are curbed. For
instance, concerns about local legitimacy and sensitivity to
underlying inequalities are better handled by local parties,
particularly those who have incentives to work bi-communally and
cooperatively. 212 Further, by decentralizing solutions from political
elites, this commission may diffuse some of the complex regional
and international tensions that have played out in past
negotiations.212
There are drawbacks to this approach. First, there is the
possibility that the establishment of a local system for negotiating
property disputes would compromise negotiations or create
inconsistencies in the parameters of settlement.21' However, both
the TRNC and the RoC must face the task of determining how to
interpret and incorporate the judgments of the European Courts
and the interests of both populations into a viable and long-term
207. But see supra notes 103, 175 and accompanying text. The U.N. has done a
better job of preserving neutrality than the E.U. See supra notes 101-103, 172 and
accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 103-110, 112-117 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 101-103, 172, 175, 181-184 and accompanying text.
210. Id.
211. Cf. supra notes 181-184 and accompanying text (outlining benefits of third
party international involvement). Contra supra notes 103, 175 (discussing negative
results of third party international involvement).
212. See supra notes 112-117, 178-180 and accompanying text.
213. Cf. supra notes 103, 112-117, 175 and accompanying text (displaying some
benefits and challenges that can come with decentralizing solutions away from
elites).
214. See supra notes 103, 116; Patrick R. Hugg, The Republic of Turkey in
Europe: Reconsidering the Luxembourg Exclusion, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 606,
608-14, 626 (2000) (discussing the complications that have resulted from such a
pluralist set of players, institutions, and influences in the Cyprus negotiations).
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political solution."' Creating a bi-communal property commission
would incorporate multiple voices and interests into the fabric of
the resolution and would establish parameters for larger political
negotiations consistent with the rights protected by the European
Courts.216
Second, incorporating a wider range of individuals into a
commission to define and implement land rights may inflame
underlying unrest.' And yet, the sorts of "ancient hatreds" that
are often assumed to exist in post-conflict societies do not appear
salient in Cyprus.' On the contrary, individual Greek and
Turkish Cypriots have demonstrated the willingness and ability to
work together on issues of reconciliation and political solution.219
Incorporating such perspectives into a property commission would
afford individuals the opportunity to contribute productively to
problem-solving and dispute resolution, and facilitate
reconciliation.220
Establishing a problem-solving body comprised of local
stakeholders and multiple interests creates an opportunity for the
people of Cyprus to contribute to the resolution of long-standing
land disputes and move toward communal reconciliation.22 1 At the
very least, empowering Greek and Turkish Cypriots to participate
in a cooperative analysis of the costs and benefits involved in
various modes of property settlement will be more likely to achieve
local legitimacy and succeed where Annan V did not.222
Conclusion
At best, the current piecemeal range of remedial mechanisms
for aggrieved Cypriots represents a problem of inconsistency for
the claimants, property occupiers, TRNC and RoC, and enforcing
bodies. And yet, grievances of the dispossessed, and uncertainty
for present occupants of contested land, persist. Establishing clear
and consistent land policies that reflect the interests of both
communities is an important part of creating economic and social
stability.22' Though resolving land disputes through negotiated
215. See supra note 57.
216. See supra notes 57, 111-117 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 198-199 and accompanying text.
218. Lindley, supra note 176, at 236.
219. See Rethinking, supra note 22, at 161.
220. See supra notes 111-117 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 111-117.
222. See supra notes 111-117 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
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settlement is the most desirable solution, past practice has
indicated that waiting on a settlement may further impede the
resolution of claims and creation of remedies.224 The ECtHR has
implied that property solutions must balance the rights of both the
former property owners and the current occupants.225
International actors have the capacity to supplement this rights-
based approach to property settlement, so long as they do not
impede local action and legitimacy. Ultimately, a bi-communal
commission, taking the best of each of these potential solutions,
can represent a plurality of actors, facilitate local legitimacy, and
establish the most equitable and just land policy going forward.
224. See supra notes 57, 63, 87, 162 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 57.
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